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Abstract 
 The SNARC (spatial numerical association of response codes) effect is the finding 
that people are generally faster to respond to smaller numbers with left-sided responses and 
larger numbers with right-sided responses. The SNARC effect has been widely reported for 
responses to symbolic representations of number such as digits. However, there is mixed 
evidence as to whether it occurs for non-symbolic representations of number, particularly 
when magnitude is irrelevant to the task. Mitchell et al. (2012) reported a SNARC effect 
when participants were asked to make orientation decisions to arrays of one-to-nine triangles 
(pointing upwards versus pointing downwards) and concluded that SNARC effects occur for 
non-symbolic, non-canonical representations of number. They additionally reported that this 
effect was stronger in the subitizing range. However, here we report four experiments that do 
not replicate either of these findings. Participants made upwards / inverted decisions to one-
to-nine triangles where total surface area was either controlled across numerosities 
(Experiments 1, 2 and 4) or increased congruently with numerosity (Experiment 3). There 
was no evidence of a SNARC effect either across the full range, or within the subset of the 
subitizing range. The results of Experiment 4 (in which we presented the original stimuli of 
Mitchell et al.) suggested that visual properties of non-symbolic displays can prompt 
SNARC-like effects driven by visual cues rather than numerosity. Taken in the context of 
other recent findings, we argue that non-symbolic representations of number do not offer a 
direct and automatic route to numerical-spatial associations.  
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Non-symbolic numerosities do not automatically activate spatial-numerical associations: 
Evidence from the SNARC effect. 
Numerical information can be represented in a multitude of ways; Arabic or Roman symbols, 
written or spoken words, finger positions, dot patterns, beads on an abacus, or graphical 
figures can all convey the same quantity in different ways. However, the dominant view is 
that, however numerical information is represented externally, it is likely that there is a 
notation-independent abstract representation of number associated with structures in the 
intraparietal sulcus (e.g., Dehaene, 1992; McCloskey, 1992; see Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & 
Dehaene, 2005 for a review; but cf. Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). One source of 
behavioural evidence for such accounts comes from tasks where quantitative information 
influences performance regardless of the specific form of notation or representation, perhaps 
most notably the spatial numerical association of response codes (or SNARC) effect (for 
reviews see e.g., Fischer & Fias, 2005; Gevers & Lammertyn, 2005; van Dijck, Ginsburg, 
Girelli, & Gevers, 2015). 
 The SNARC effect is the finding that people are generally faster to respond to small 
quantities with a left-sided response and to larger quantities with a right-sided response. In 
their seminal paper, Dehaene, Bossini and Giraux (1993) asked participants to respond to the 
parity of numbers using left- and right-hand key presses, and reported a SNARC effect that 
they attributed to a “mental number line”. Dehaene et al. found the strongest effect for Arabic 
numerals, with weaker effects for verbal numerals. They interpreted this finding in the 
context of Dehaene’s (1992) triple-code model, which postulates three concrete 
representations for number: a visual Arabic number form, an auditory verbal word frame, and 
an analogue magnitude representation. They argued that the stronger SNARC effect for 
Arabic numbers reflects an automatic pathway to the analogue magnitude representation, 
with verbal numbers following a less automatic pathway. The finding that SNARC effects 
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vary by notation has been reported elsewhere. For example, Hung, Hung, Tzeng, and Wu 
(2008) found a SNARC effect for parity decisions to digits, but not to Chinese numerical 
words. However, others have found the SNARC effect to be relatively unaffected by 
notation; for example, Nuerk, Wood, and Willmes (2005) reported similar SNARC effects for 
parity decisions to auditory number words, visual Arabic numerals, visual number words and 
visual dice patterns and concluded that the SNARC effect reflects automatic access to an 
amodal semantic magnitude representation that is unaffected by number form.  
Whereas the SNARC effect for symbolic number has been reported multiple times 
and using multiple numerical formats, (see Wood, Willmes, Nuerk, & Fischer, 2008, for a 
meta-analysis), there are only a handful of reported studies that investigate SNARC (or 
SNARC-like) effects for non-symbolic, non-canonical representations of number (see 
Buijsman & Tirado, in press, for a review), and the majority of these studies use tasks where 
numerical magnitude is relevant to the task. Patro and Haman (2012) asked pre-schoolers 
(aged between 2 years 8 months and 4 years 11 months) to indicate which of two “plates of 
sweets” (two sets of coloured rectangles on a touch-screen) had more or fewer sweets. 
Children were faster to make “more” responses on the right and there was a trend for them to 
be faster to make “less” responses on the left. Ebersbach, Luwel, and Verschaffel (2014) 
asked children (mean age 5 years 11  months) to indicate whether arrays of 5, 10, 40 or 80 
dots contained more or fewer than 20 dots in the context of deciding whether they had more 
or fewer “cookies” (brown dots) than “guests” (blue dots). Children were faster to respond to 
40 or 80 dots with their right hand and faster to respond to 5 or 10 dots with their left hand. In 
adults, Nemeh, Humberstone, Yates and Reeve (2018) reported a SNARC effect when 
performing referent-to-target judgements. Participants who judged whether arrays of dots 
(e.g., 45 or 15 dots) were more or less numerous than a referent array of 30 dots were faster 
to respond to smaller non-symbolic magnitudes with their left hand and to larger non-
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symbolic magnitudes with their right hand. Zhou, Shen, Li, Li and Cui (2016) used a 
numerosity matching task, where adult participants were asked to judge whether two 
sequentially presented dot arrays had the same or different numbers of dots; the numerosities 
used (11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, and 29) meant that this was an approximation task. They found a 
SNARC-like effect such that participants were faster to respond to large numerosities with 
the right hand and faster to respond to smaller numerosities using the left hand. They did not 
find a similar effect for judgements of continuous magnitude (when participants matched area 
or dot density), and concluded that there is an autonomous mental numerosity line associated 
with the approximate number system. 
Notably, in all of these studies, magnitude was relevant to the task. This stands in 
contrast to the literature on SNARC effects for symbolic representations of number, where 
magnitude is very often irrelevant to the task. Indeed, there is evidence from studies of 
SNARC effects in symbolic number that the SNARC effect for parity and magnitude 
judgement may reflect different processes, with SNARC effects for magnitude more 
categorical in nature and SNARC effects for parity more continuous (e.g., Gevers, Verguts, 
Reynvoet, Caessens, & Fias, 2006; Wood et al., 2008). Furthermore, the processing of parity 
versus magnitude is differentially affected by working memory demands (van Dijck, Gevers, 
& Fias, 2009), and differentially predicted by arithmetic performance and visualization 
profile (Georges, Hoffmann, & Schiltz, 2017). In other words, a direct comparison between 
spatial-numerical associations for symbolic and non-symbolic number is not complete 
without tasks that require only implicit magnitude processing. However, comparatively few 
studies have examined tasks where numerical magnitude is irrelevant to the task. Mitchell, 
Bull, and Cleland (2012) asked participants to indicate with left- and right-hand key presses 
whether arrays of one-to-nine triangles were presented pointing upwards or downwards, and 
found a significant SNARC effect that was most marked for the subitizing range (i.e., one to 
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four triangles). They interpreted their results along the lines of Fias, Lauwereyns, and 
Lammertyn’s (2001) “neural overlap” account. Fias et al. had reported a SNARC effect for 
orientation decisions to single triangles superimposed upon digits, but not for colour 
decisions to digits, and attributed this to the overlapping parietal structures that process 
orientation and magnitude. In a similar pattern of findings, Mitchell et al. did not find a 
SNARC effect for colour decision to circles, and therefore proposed that non-symbolic 
representations of number can trigger “automatic” access to semantic representations, but 
potentially only when the neural structures underlying the task overlap with magnitude (note 
that colour processing is not believed to rely substantially on parietal areas, e.g., Chao & 
Martin, 1999). Mitchell et al. further suggested that the increased SNARC effect in the 
subitizing range could reflect an approximate number system that represents numerosity with 
increasing representational overlap, either due to increasing noise with increasing magnitude 
(Gallistel & Gelman, 1992), or logarithmic compression of the representation with fixed 
noise (Dehaene, 2003; Verguts & Fias, 2004). Either possibility would suggest less spatial 
precision for magnitudes in the higher range. Simmons, Gallagher-Mitchell, and Ogden (in 
press) replicated the SNARC effect for the same set of stimuli, although they do not report 
whether they replicated the enhanced SNARC effect in the subitizing range.  
Further evidence of SNARC effects for task-irrelevant non-symbolic number comes 
from Bulf, Macchi Cassia and de Hevia (2014), who used a task based on Fischer, Castel, 
Dodd and Pratt’s (2003) visual detection task. Participants were presented with either the 
digits 2 or 9, or with two or nine dots presented centrally on a screen. This was then followed 
by a to-be-detected target presented either on the left or right of the screen. For both 
representations, participants were faster to detect a target on the right following larger 
numerical magnitudes and the left following smaller numerical magnitudes. Bulf et al. argued 
that these findings are consistent with abstract numerical representations and with the view 
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that numerical information is spontaneously associated with space. Furthermore, they argued 
that these spontaneous spatial associations are not driven by experience with external 
representations of number such as rulers or graphs. This conclusion is supported by their 
subsequent finding that two- and nine-dot arrays orient preverbal infants’ visual attention 
towards the left and right respectively (Bulf, de Hevia, & Macchi Cassia, 2016). 
Mitchell et al.’s (2012), Simmon et al.’s (in press), and Bulf et al.’s (2014) findings 
suggest that non-symbolic number could offer at least as strong a route to spatial associations 
as symbolic number. However, there are no other reports, to our knowledge, of SNARC 
effects for non-symbolic number when magnitude is irrelevant to the task. More 
problematically, these effects have only been reported for a limited range of stimuli. Mitchell 
et al. and Simmon et al. used the same stimuli set (personal communication), and Bulf et al. 
only used arrays of two and nine dots. Furthermore, Cleland and Bull (2019) reported no 
evidence of a SNARC effect for responses to arrays of circles. In this study, participants 
made binary colour decisions to arrays of one to nine circles presented on a computer screen. 
The arrays either appeared immediately in colour, or were displayed in black for 200 ms or 
400 ms before changing colour. Importantly, a parallel experiment in the same series used an 
identical procedure but with coloured digits, allowing a direct comparison between symbolic 
and non-symbolic representations. Whereas there was strong evidence for a SNARC effect in 
the experiment using digits, there was no evidence of a SNARC effect in the experiment 
using circles, despite reaction times for the two tasks being similar (440 ms for colour 
decisions to digits and 436 ms for decisions to circles). Cleland and Bull concluded that non-
symbolic number differs from symbolic number in that it does not provide a direct and 
automatic route to spatial associations with magnitude.  
The current studies  
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The SNARC effect for orientation to non-symbolic numerosities has only been 
reported with one set of stimuli (Mitchell et al., 2012; Simmons et al., in press). Furthermore, 
only one array of each numerosity was used during these experiments, meaning that each 
numerosity always looked the same and was seen repeatedly by each participant (Mitchell et 
al. presented each array 16 times upright and 16 times inverted, and Simmons et al. presented 
each array eight times upright and eight times inverted). The repeated use of identical arrays 
raises at least two issues. Firstly, it is possible that participants memorised the arrays over the 
course of the study and began to assign them verbal labels (either numerical labels, or simply 
“small” versus “large”), which might account for the SNARC effect, particularly under 
conceptual or verbal coding accounts of the SNARC effect (e.g., Gevers, Verguts, Reynvoet, 
Caessens, & Fias, 2006; Proctor & Cho, 2006). Secondly, seemingly insignificant visual 
properties of the array (e.g., placement of individual items) might influence participants’ 
responses, a risk that is amplified by repeated viewing of the same arrays. The initial aim of 
the current studies was to establish whether the SNARC effect for orientation decisions to 
non-symbolic number replicated with a wider range of stimuli, and whether this might be 
modulated by visual cues to magnitude unrelated to numerosity (specifically, the aggregate 
surface area of the triangles, and their subtended area).  
In Experiment 1, participants made orientation decisions to arrays of between one and 
nine triangles, with multiple arrays for each numerosity. If the SNARC effect is indeed 
triggered by response-irrelevant magnitude (as argued by Mitchell et al., 2012), we would 
expect to find a SNARC effect in this study regardless of the change in stimuli. In 
Experiment 2, each participant saw only one version of each numerosity but across the 
participants these arrays were varied; this allowed us to test the hypothesis that repeated use 
of the same arrays contributed to the SNARC effect in Mitchell et al.  
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The aggregate surface area (i.e., the summed total surface area) of the triangles in any 
given array was held constant in Experiments 1 and 2. Controlling such non-numerical visual 
cues in the stimuli can create a conflict between different potential cues to magnitude (see 
e.g., Gebuis, Cohen Kadosh, & Gevers, 2016; Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012).  Visual properties 
such as aggregate surface area have been demonstrated to affect performance on tasks with a 
spatial component; for example, Cleland and Bull (2015) reported that participants 
performing a bisection task to a line flanked by numerosities were at least as influenced by 
subtended area and aggregate surface area as they were by number of items. Ren, Nicholls, 
Ma, and Chen (2011) found SNARC-like effects when participants made relative judgments 
of the physical sizes of two disks such that responses with the right hand were faster for large 
than small targets. This finding is particularly relevant, given that controlling the aggregate 
surface area of the triangles meant that the mean surface area of the individual triangles 
decreased as numerosity increased. Furthermore, there is a large literature on the “size 
congruity effect”, where physical size interferes in semantic magnitude comparisons (e.g., 
Banks & Flora, 1977), including for digit magnitude (e.g., Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). There is 
also evidence that conflicting cues to magnitude might eliminate the SNARC effect under 
certain conditions; for example, Holmes and Lourenco (2013) found that placing a weight on 
participants’ left wrists eliminated the SNARC effect. Taking together these disparate 
findings, it would be reasonable to predict that over-controlling visual cues to magnitude 
might eliminate any potential SNARC effect in Experiments 1 and 2. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3, we allowed the aggregate surface area and subtended surface area to vary 
congruently with magnitude. This was to test the hypothesis that the lack of a SNARC effect 
in Experiments 1 and 2 might be prompted by the conflict between numerosity itself and the 
visual cues that would normally co-vary congruently with magnitude.  
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Finally, Experiment 4 was designed to address two crucial differences between 
Experiments 1-3 and Mitchell et al.’s (2012) original study. The first was that the stimulus 
sets in Experiments 1-3 all included an array of five triangles, whereas Mitchell et al. did not 
include a five-triangle array. It is possible that the omission of a five-triangle array made 
participants more likely to allocate each array to either a “small” (1-4) or “large” (6-9) label. 
Under a verbal coding account, this might explain why Mitchell et al. found a SNARC effect. 
However, given the fact that there was only one array for each numerosity, it is also possible 
that some visual property of the arrangement of the triangles prompted the SNARC effect. In 
order to distinguish these possibilities, Experiment 4 was a direct replication of Mitchell et al. 
(2012) using two versions of the original set of stimuli; one that was the same as that used by 
Mitchell et al., and another where the stimuli were flipped on the vertical axis. If the omission 
of the five-triangle array caused the SNARC effect, we would expect to see a SNARC effect 
across both sets of stimuli. However, if Mitchell et al.’s finding was prompted by visual 
properties of the stimuli we would expect to see a SNARC effect for the original set of 
stimuli that subsequently reversed for the flipped stimuli. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-four participants took part in the study (12 men, 51 women, one 
chose not to specify; mean age 22 years, SD = 5.68, two declined to provide ages; 56 right-
handed based on self-report, seven left-handed, one declined to report). A further three 
participants were excluded from the analysis based on making excessive errors on the task 
(13% and above). 
Stimuli and Procedure. 
Stimuli. The stimuli were arrays of 1-9 equilateral black triangles, which could appear 
either upright or inverted. The total surface area of the triangles in each array was 500 mm2, 
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with the surface area of individual triangles varied within this. Four different arrays were 
created for each numerosity above one, with the surface area of individual triangles and the 
arrangement of the triangles within the array varied for each different array. The triangles 
were displayed such that they occupied a notional circle 50 mm in diameter, with an area of 
1963 mm2. So far as possible, this subtended area was kept constant across stimuli (although 
note that in the lower range this was not practical, with stimuli inevitably occupying a smaller 
convex hull). Upright and inverted versions of each array were created; as such, there were 
eight different possible stimuli for each of the numerosities above one. 
Procedure. Participants were instructed that they should indicate whether the triangles 
presented onscreen were upright or inverted. Response mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants; half of the participants responded to upright triangles with the M key and 
inverted triangles with the Z key of a QWERTY keyboard, and half responded with the 
reverse mapping. On each trial, a fixation cross was presented centrally for 1000 ms. This 
was then replaced by the array of triangles, which remained onscreen for 2000 ms or until the 
participant made a response. This was followed by a blank screen for 1000 ms before the 
fixation point for the next trial. The experimental session consisted of 288 trials in total (32 
presentations of each numerosity, 16 upright and 16 inverted), presented in two blocks of 144 
trials with a rest break in between. The main experimental session was preceded by a practice 
block of 18 trials, during which participants were provided with feedback on accuracy and 
reaction time. No feedback was provided during the experimental block. The experimental 
stimuli were presented on a Dell 19” flat panel monitor using a Dell PC running Windows 7, 
with key presses recorded from a Dell keyboard. Stimuli were presented and reaction times 
recorded using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA).   
Results and Discussion 
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In all experiments, reaction times for each numerosity responded to with the left and 
right key were collated and the median reaction time calculated (correct responses only). The 
difference in time to respond to each numerosity with the right and left hand was then 
calculated (right hand reaction time – left hand reaction time). The nature of the SNARC 
effect was captured by regression analyses (Lorch & Myers, 1990, Method 3; for a detailed 
discussion, see Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & d’Ydewalle, 1996). A regression equation was 
computed for each participant, with numerosity as the predictor variable and reaction time 
difference as the criterion variable. The regression weight (standardised β) was recorded for 
each participant, and a one-sample t-test conducted to determine whether the regression 
weights across participants differed significantly from 0 (a flat line). 
The mean error rate was 3.43%, and the mean reaction time for correct trials was 455 
ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that the regression weight did not differ significantly from 
0, mean β = .0009, t (63) = .02, p = .984, d = .003, CI[-.088, .09]. A Bayesian one-sample t-
test using a Cauchy prior width of 1.0 (see, e.g., Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 
2009) yielded a Bayes Factor (BF10) of 0.098, suggesting moderate evidence for the null 
hypothesis. The mean response time differences across the numerosities are displayed in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Mean reaction time differences for each numerosity in Experiment 1. Errors show 
+/- 1 standard error. The shaded area show the 95% confidence interval for the trend line. All 
graphs were generated using ggplot 2 (Wickham, 2009) in R (R Core Team, 2016). 
 
 An additional analysis was run solely on the subitizing range. As with the full range, 
there was no evidence of a SNARC effect, mean β = .090, t (63) = 1.18, p = .242, d = .148, 
CI[-.062 ,242], BF10 = .194. 
To summarise, there was no evidence of a SNARC effect in Experiment 1. This may 
point to a Type I error in Mitchell et al.’s original study, but it is necessary to rule out other 
explanations. One issue is that participants in Experiment 1 saw a range of different stimulus 
arrays for each of the numerosities (with the exception of the one-triangle array, which 
remained constant). However, in Mitchell et al.’s study, participants only saw one version of 
each numerosity, with each participant viewing each numerosity 32 times (16 times upright 
and 16 times inverted). It is possible that participants started to recognise the stimuli over the 
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course of the experiment and began to label them verbally. Over the course of the study we 
might therefore expect to see participants develop a stronger association between each non-
symbolic display and its magnitude and spatial associations. Alternatively, the repetition of 
arrays might make it easier for participants to build a stable ordinal representation of the 
stimuli in working memory, thus producing a SNARC effect (see e.g., van Dijck, & Fias, 
2011). These explanations might also account for the enhanced SNARC effect reported in the 
subitizing range, if we assume that the smaller numerosities are more distinctive and easier to 
remember. If repetition of the stimuli was the cause of the SNARC effect in Mitchell et al., 
we would expect to see a SNARC effect for repeated use of non-symbolic displays regardless 
of the individual stimulus set. To test this hypothesis, in Experiment 2 each participant saw 
only one version of each numerosity array. We varied the numerosity arrays across 
participants in order to eliminate the possibility that the visual properties of individual arrays 
might influence responses. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Participants. Sixty-four participants took part in the study (14 men; mean age 21 
years, SD = 4.12; 58 right-handed based on self-report). One further participant was excluded 
from the analysis based on having made an excessive number of errors (15%). 
 Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 
with one exception. Rather than seeing multiple versions of each numerosity, each participant 
only saw one version throughout the experiment (the inverted stimuli was a flipped version of 
the upright version). In order to rule out the influence of visual properties specific to any one 
arrangement of items, different participants saw different items (with four different 
arrangements of each counterbalanced across participants). As with Experiment 1, half of the 
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participants responded to upright triangles with the M key and inverted triangles with the Z 
key, with the response mapping reversed for the other half. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean error rate was 3.40%, and the mean reaction time for correct trials was 440 
ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that the regression weight did not differ significantly from 
0, mean β = .038, t(63) = .733, p = .466, d = .092, CI[-.066, .142]. A Bayesian one-sample t-
test using a Cauchy prior width of 1.0 yielded a Bayes Factor (BF10) of .128, suggesting 
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis. The mean response time differences across the 
numerosities are displayed in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean response time difference for each numerosity in Experiment 2. Errors bars 
show +/-1 standard error. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend 
line. 
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An additional analysis was run solely on the subitizing range. As with the full range, 
there was no evidence of a SNARC effect, mean β = -.011, t (63) = -.151, p = .881, d = .019, 
CI[.152, .130], BF10 = .099. 
In Experiment 2, we found no evidence for a SNARC effect even though participants 
saw the same arrays of stimuli repeatedly across the course of the experiment. We conclude 
therefore that it is unlikely the SNARC effect in Mitchell et al. (2012) was driven by repeated 
exposure to the same non-symbolic arrays. There remain two differences between 
Experiment 2 and Mitchell et al; the omission of a five-triangle array in Mitchell et al., and 
the specific stimuli used. We return to this issue in Experiment 4. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, we controlled visual cues to magnitude unrelated to 
numerosity, specifically aggregate surface area and, so far as possible, the area subtended by 
the stimulus. However, as discussed in the Introduction, this sets up a conflict between 
numerosity and visual cues that would normally be informative as to magnitude. While such 
controls ensure that we are tapping numerosity rather than other visual cues, such control is in 
many ways artificial; in real life, objects do not get smaller because there are more of them 
(see e.g., Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012, for discussion). In Experiment 3, we allowed aggregate 
surface area and the area subtended by the stimulus to vary congruently with numerical 
magnitude. This allowed us to test the hypothesis that removing the conflict between 
numerical and non-numerical cues to magnitude might prompt a SNARC effect. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-four participants took part in the study (10 men; mean age 20 
years, SD = 1.49; 59 right-handed based on self-report). Three further participants were 
excluded from the analysis based on having made an excessive number of errors (10% and 
above). 
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 Stimuli and Procedure. In Experiment 3, each individual triangle had a surface area 
of 100 mm2 for all numerosities. In other words, the aggregate surface area of the triangle 
stimuli ranged from 100 mm2 for the one triangle display up to 900 mm2 for the nine triangle 
display. The spacing between triangles was kept constant so that the convex hull of the 
displays increased with numerosity. For example, nine triangle displays subtended a circle of 
approximately 4901 mm2. As in Experiment 1, four different arrays were created for each 
numerosity above one, with the arrangement of the triangles within the array varied for each 
different array. These were then flipped to create the inverted versions of each array. In all 
other respects, the stimuli and procedure were the same as Experiments 1 and 2. 
Results and Discussion 
 The mean error rate was 3.24%, and the mean reaction time for correct trials was 469 
ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that the regression weight did not differ significantly from 
0, mean β = -.020, t (63) = -.463, p = .645, d = .058, CI[.-.105, .065]. A Bayesian one-sample 
t-test using a Cauchy prior width of 1.0 yielded a Bayes Factor (BF10) of .109, suggesting 
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis. The mean response time differences across 
numerosities are displayed in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Mean response time difference for each numerosity in Experiment 2. Errors bars 
show +/-1 standard error. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend 
line. 
 
An additional analysis was run solely on the subitizing range. As with the full range, 
there was no evidence of a SNARC effect, mean β = -.011, t (63) = -.151, p = .881, d = .148, 
CI[-.152, .130], BF10 = .103.  
In Experiment 3, we did not find evidence of a SNARC effect, despite the fact that 
numerical and non-numerical cues to magnitude were entirely congruent. On the basis of this 
finding, we do not believe that the lack of a SNARC effect in Experiments 1 and 2 was due to 
the conflict in visual cues to magnitude.  
Experiment 4 was a more direct replication of Mitchell et al. (2012). In Experiments 
1-3, we included a five-triangle array, whereas Mitchell et al. presented either 1-4 or 6-9 
triangles. It is possible that this made participants more aware of a “smallness” or “largeness” 
to the numerosities displayed on the screen, and more likely to assign them a verbal code or 
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polarity (following accounts such as e.g., Gevers, Verguts, et al., 2006; Proctor & Cho, 
2006). Another possibility is that some visual property of the placement of the triangles on 
the screen prompted participants to respond in a SNARC-like manner. A straightforward 
replication of Mitchell et al. would not allow us to distinguish these possibilities; however, 
reversing the stimulus set for half of the participants in Experiment 4 allowed us to 
investigate which was more likely. If the omission of the five-triangle array caused the 
SNARC effect, we would expect to see a SNARC effect across both sets of stimuli. However, 
if visual properties of the stimuli caused the effect, we would expect to see a SNARC-like 
effect for the original stimuli but potentially an eliminated or directionally opposite effect for 
the reversed stimuli. 
Experiment 4 
Method 
 Participants. Sixty-four participants took part in the study (20 men; mean age 23 
years, SD = 6.74; 56 right-handed based on self-report). Two further participants were 
excluded from the analysis based on having made an excessive number of errors (12% and 
above). 
 Stimuli and Procedure. The stimuli were arrays of 1 – 9 (excluding 5) equilateral 
green triangles, which could appear either upright or inverted. The images displayed were 
taken from the original .bmp files used by Mitchell et al. (2012, Experiment2). The total 
surface area of the triangles in each array was 452 mm2, with the surface area of individual 
triangles varied within this. The triangles occupied a notional circle 60 mm in diameter and 
were displayed in a green shade selected from the PANTONETM colour-wheel, green (362C). 
Whereas Mitchell et al. only displayed one version of each numerosity, we reversed the 
stimuli on the vertical axis for half of the participants. 
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 Response mapping and stimuli set were counterbalanced across participants such that 
16 participants responded to the original set of stimuli using the M key for upright triangles 
and the Z key for inverted triangles, and 16 responded to the same stimuli with the reverse 
mapping. A further 16 participants responded to the reversed set of stimuli using the M key 
for upright triangles and the Z key for inverted triangles, and the remaining 16 responded to 
the reversed stimuli with the reverse response mapping.  
 The timing of stimulus presentation was identical to Experiments 1 – 3. The 
experimental session consisted of 256 trials in total (32 presentations of each numerosity, 16 
upright, 16 inverted), presented in one block. The rest break was omitted to keep the 
procedure similar to Mitchell et al.’s Experiment 2. The main experimental session was 
preceded by a practice block of 16 trials, during which participants were provided with 
feedback on accuracy and reaction time. No feedback was provided during the experimental 
block.  
Results and Discussion 
The mean error rate was 9.25 %, and the mean reaction time for correct trials was 428 
ms. A one-sample t-test revealed that the regression weight did not differ significantly from 
0, mean β = -.018, t (63) = -.335, p = .739, d = .042, CI[-.122, .087]. A Bayesian one-sample 
t-test using a Cauchy prior width of 1.0 yielded a Bayes Factor (BF10) of .104, suggesting 
moderate evidence for the null hypothesis. The mean response time differences across 
numerosities are displayed in Figure 4. 
An additional analysis was run solely on the subitizing range. As with the full range, 
there was no evidence of a SNARC effect, mean β = .141, t (63) = 1.958, p = .055, d = .245, 
CI[-.003, .285]. The Bayesian one-sample t-test yielded a Bayes Factor of .616 suggesting 
only anecdotal evidence for the null hypothesis; however, it should be noted that the 
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regression weight was positive rather than the negative value we would normally expect to 
see in a SNARC study.  
 
Figure 4. Mean response time difference for each numerosity in Experiment 4. Errors bars 
show +/-1 standard error. The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval for the trend 
line. 
 
 An independent samples t-test revealed that the regression weight for the original 
stimuli set (β = -.226) differed significantly from the regression weight for the reversed 
stimuli set (β = .191), t (62) = -4.562, p < .001, d = 1.141, CI [-.599, -.234], BF10 = 816.770 
(indicating extreme evidence for the hypothesis). When considered alone, the original set of 
stimuli yielded a negative regression weight that differed significantly from 0, mean β = -
.226, t (31) = -3.333, p = .002, d = .589, CI[-.364, -.088], BF10 = 13.998, whereas the 
reversed set of stimuli yielded a positive regression weight that differed significantly from 0, 
β = .191, t (31) = 3.116, p = .004, d = .551, CI[.066, .316], BF10 = 8.411. Mean response time 
differences across all numerosities and split by stimuli condition are presented in Figure 5.  
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 Mitchell et al. (2012) reported the strongest SNARC effect in the subitizing range 
using this set of stimuli. In order to test whether this finding replicated, we analysed the 
subitizing range alone for each version of the stimulus set. There was no evidence of a 
SNARC effect in the subitizing range for the original set of stimuli, mean β = -.040, t (31) = -
.414, p = .681, d = .073, CI[-.235, .156], BF10 = .149. However, the positive regression 
weight did differ significantly from 0 for the reversed stimuli in the subitizing range, mean β 
= .322, t (31) = 3.252, p = .003, d = .575, CI[.012, .524], BF10 = 11.542.  
 
Figure 5. Mean response time difference for each numerosity in Experiment 4 when broken 
down by the stimuli originally used in Mitchell et al. (2012) (“Original”) and the reversed 
versions (“Reversed”). Errors bars show +/-1 standard error. The shaded area shows the 95% 
confidence interval for the trend lines. 
 
 To summarise, we did not find an overall SNARC effect in Experiment 4. However, 
there was an apparent SNARC effect for the original set of stimuli, that was cancelled out by 
a reverse-SNARC effect in the mirror-reversed stimuli. This finding provides us with strong 
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evidence that the finding of a SNARC effect in Mitchell et al. (2012) was driven by the visual 
properties of the stimuli rather than by participants coding the 1-4 triangle arrays as “small” 
and the 6-9 triangle arrays as “large” (had this been the case, we would expect to see a 
SNARC effects across both stimulus types).  
General Discussion 
 Across four experiments, we found no evidence for a SNARC effect for orientation 
decisions to non-symbolic representations of number, regardless of whether stimuli were 
repeated across trials, regardless of whether visual cues to magnitude (in other words, 
subtended area and aggregate surface area) increased congruently with numerosity, and 
regardless of whether we focussed solely on the subitizing range. In other words, we did not 
replicate Mitchell et al.’s (2012) and Simmons et al.’s (in press) findings of a SNARC effect 
for orientation decisions to non-symbolic number, using a wide range of stimuli, a large 
sample size, and across four separate studies.  
 The one exception across our studies was when we used the original stimuli from 
Mitchell et al. (2012); in this case, we found what appeared to be a left-to-right oriented 
SNARC effect. However, when participants viewed the same stimuli reversed on the vertical 
axis, we found a right-to-left oriented effect. This strongly suggests that the visual properties 
of the stimuli used in Mitchell et al. (2012) may have prompted the SNARC effect. It is 
difficult to say exactly what it is about the stimuli that could have driven the effect. The most 
obvious possibility would be that something about the distribution of the shapes influenced 
responses, for example if more of the triangles appeared to one side of fixation than the other 
it might cause a SIMON-like effect where left-handed responses were faster. This might 
create an apparent SNARC effect if all 1-4 arrays had larger triangles on the left and all 6-9 
arrays had larger triangles on the right. The stimuli were presented within a notional circle 60 
mm in diameter (i.e., 2827 mm2), and the triangles themselves had a total aggregate surface 
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area of 452 mm2. On close inspection, we found that some arrays appeared to be slightly off-
set to the left within the display circle area. However, upright and inverted versions of the 
stimuli were mirrored versions of one another (see example of the two- and three-triangle 
arrays in Figure 6). 
 
  
 Figure 6. The two- and three-triangle arrays from Mitchell et al.’s (2012) original 
experiment. 
 
For the upright three-triangle array, we can see that there is more total triangle area towards 
the left of the array, and that the largest of the three triangles is positioned towards the left of 
the array. On viewing experimental trials, the stimuli give the impression of being leftwards 
of the fixation cross. However, the inverted version of the same stimulus is a mirror image 
and so there is now more total triangle area towards the right, with the largest of the three 
triangles on the right edge of the array. As such, any influence of stimulus placement should 
in theory be balanced out across the upright and inverted trials.  The two-triangle array has a 
larger triangle towards the left in the inverted version, but the upright version of the same 
array has the larger triangle on the right. What does remain constant between the upright and 
inverted versions of the two-triangle array is that the triangles appear on a diagonal axis 
running from top left to bottom right, but it seems unlikely that this would matter given 
findings that suggest a bottom-right to top-left diagonal for the SNARC effect (Gevers, 
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Lammertyn, Notebaert, Verguts, & Fias, 2006). In short, it is hard to say exactly what it is 
about the stimulus placement that prompted the effect, but it is likely that any effect was 
exacerbated by the repeated presentation of the same stimuli. This finding underlines the 
critical importance of presenting a range of stimuli when investigating spatial-numerical 
associations in non-symbolic stimuli.    
Taken together, the general pattern of findings reported here leads us to conclude that 
non-symbolic, non-canonical representations of number alone are not sufficient to trigger a 
SNARC effect. We did not run a parallel study with digits to compare across numerical form, 
but SNARC effects for orientation decisions in digit-based tasks have been reported 
elsewhere. Fias et al. (2001) reported a SNARC effect for orientation decisions to shapes 
superimposed upon digits. Similarly, Lammertyn, Fias and Lauwereyns (2002) reported a 
SNARC effect for orientation decisions to digits that were presented either upright or tilted 
10 degrees to the right. The contrasting pattern of findings for non-symbolic number and 
digits in orientation decision is similar to the pattern for colour decision reported by Cleland 
and Bull (2019), who found a SNARC effect for colour decisions (when colour onset was 
manipulated) to digits, but not circles. Taking these results together, the emerging message is 
that it is unlikely that non-symbolic number spontaneously activates spatial associations with 
number. More broadly, this finding is generally consistent with research from other forms of 
numerical notation that indicate that the SNARC effect does not consistently emerge for 
symbolic number either, and may reflect the nature of the task rather than some inherent and 
universal cognitive strategy of spatial associations. For example, Shaki and Fischer (2018) 
reported that spatial-numerical associations do not arise in a parity task when there is no 
explicit activation of either spatial-directional processing or magnitude processing, and 
SNARC effects do not arise for colour decision to numbers under the simplest conditions 
(Cleland & Bull, 2019; Fias et al., 2001). 
SNARC and non-symbolic number 
 
26 
 
How do we reconcile the lack of a SNARC effect with the existing literature? If we 
exclude Mitchell et al. (2012) and Simmons et al. (in press), then (to our knowledge), Bulf et 
al. (2014) is the only report of SNARC-like effects in adults for non-symbolic number when 
magnitude is completely irrelevant to the task. Participants detected targets on the right faster 
when they were preceded by larger numbers (either digits or dot arrays) and faster on the left 
when preceded by smaller numbers. However, Bulf et al. only used arrays of either two or 
nine dots; given the findings of Experiment 4 in the current series of studies, we would very 
much like to see Bulf et al.’s paradigm repeated with a wider range of numerosities. Other 
findings in adults have used tasks where magnitude is relevant to the task (e.g., Nemeh et al., 
2018; Zhou et al., 2016), suggesting a distinction between how magnitude is associated with 
space (or how those spatial associations are accessed) for implicit and explicit tasks.  
While there has been comparatively little research into SNARC effects for non-
symbolic number in adults, there are a number of studies that report SNARC (or SNARC-
like) effects in young children (e.g., Aulet & Lourenco, 2018; Bulf et al., 2016; de Hevia, 
Girelli, Addabbo, & Macchi Cassia, 2014; Ebersbach et al., 2014; Patro & Haman, 2012). In 
many of these studies, magnitude is relevant to the task (Aulet & Lourenco, 2018; Ebersbach 
et al., 2014; Patro & Haman, 2012), but some have used tasks that did not require magnitude 
processing. In a modified version of the cueing paradigm used by Bulf et al. (2014) in adults, 
Bulf et al. (2016) found that two-dot arrays oriented 8-9 month olds’ visual attention to the 
left side of space and nine-dot arrays to the right. De Hevia, Girelli, et al. (2014) found that 7-
month-old infants show a preference for a left-to-right orientation for increasing 
numerosities. Indeed, there is evidence that even non-human animals may associate small 
numerosities with left-sided space and larger numerosities with right-sided space, including 
day-old chicks (e.g., Rugani, Vallortigara, Priftis, & Regolin, 2015), rhesus monkeys 
(Drucker & Brannon, 2014), and chimpanzees (Adachi, 2014; see Rugani & de Hevia, 2017, 
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for a review of number-space associations in preverbal infants and non-human animals). 
Patro and Haman (2012) used a magnitude decision task, but noted that spatial associations 
were most apparent in children who were classified as “precounting” on the basis of a pre-test 
(mean age 3 years 11 months). For the children who understood counting (mean age 4 years 1 
month), there was some evidence of an association with space but it only held for the 2-4 
range. Taken together, these studies raise the possibility that very young children (and, 
potentially, non-human animals) hold stronger spatial-numerical associations with non-
symbolic number than older children or adults.  A speculative hypothesis would be that 
infants are predisposed to associate number with space (see de Hevia, Izard, Coubart, Spelke, 
& Streri, 2014, for evidence from neonates), and this underlies early findings of number-
space associations in infants and children. However, as children’s daily experience with 
number shifts from predominantly non-symbolic to predominantly symbolic, their spatial 
associations may make a corresponding shift and be additionally shaped by factors such as 
finger counting preferences and writing direction (see, e.g., Fischer, 2012, for discussion of 
finger counting and SNARC). 
 Finally, we turn to how our findings might be incorporated into current models of 
SNARC effects. The most extreme interpretation of a differing pattern for SNARC effects 
across numerical forms, as advocated by Cohen Kadosh and Walsh (2009), is that it provides 
evidence against an abstract numerical representation. For example, Cohen Kadosh and 
Walsh cite Hung et al. (2008) as evidence for non-abstract representations, as Hung et al. 
found a SNARC effect for parity decision to digits but not to Chinese numerical words. The 
logic that a notation-independent SNARC effect is evidence for abstract representations has 
been proposed elsewhere; for example, Nuerk et al. (2005) concluded that “the SNARC 
effect indexes the existence of an automatic pathway to an amodal semantic magnitude 
representation” (p. 191), and Bulf et al. (2014) argued that their results supported “the view 
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of an abstract representation of numerical representation” (p. 6). The logic inverse of this 
would be that a modality-dependent SNARC effect is evidence against abstract 
representations. However, alternative explanations are possible. It is possible that the 
difference in SNARC effects for different numerical forms reflects the automaticity of 
pathways to magnitude (as argued by Dehaene et al., 1993). Under such an account, symbolic 
and non-symbolic number might access the same shared magnitude representations but differ 
in the automaticity with which they are accessed. This automaticity could reflect the skill 
with which people can extract numerical information (e.g. Cantlon, Cordes, Libertus, & 
Brannon, 2009; Dehaene, 2009; Ganor-Stern, 2009) from different representations of 
magnitude, or be influenced by the external representations of a given number format that 
people experience on a day-to-day basis (e.g., rulers, numbers on a QWERTY keyboard).  
Under working memory accounts of the SNARC effect, the SNARC effect arises 
from the spatial coding of ordinal information in working memory (e.g., Fias, van Dijck, & 
Gevers, 2011; Fischer, Mills, & Shaki, 2010; van Dijck & Fias, 2011; see Fias & van Dijck, 
2016 for a review). Short-term numerical-space associations underlie the SNARC effect 
rather than an explicit and permanent “mental number line”. This account is well-supported 
by findings of apparent spatial associations with different kinds of ordinal information (e.g., 
Gevers, Reynvoet, & Fias, 2003; van Dijck & Fias, 2011). For example, Gevers et al. 
reported SNARC-like effects for both months and letters (based on position in the alphabet). 
Van Dijck and Fias (2011) asked participants to memorise sequences of fruit and vegetables, 
and then perform a fruit-vegetable categorization task. They found that items presented at the 
beginning of the memory sequence were responded to faster and more accurately with the left 
hand than the right hand, whereas items presented towards the end were responded to faster 
and more accurately with the right hand. We believe that the current findings are consistent 
with such working memory accounts under the assumption that non-symbolic, non-canonical 
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representations of number are more difficult to conceptualise as an ordinal sequence. This 
would certainly explain why canonical non-symbolic number in the form of dice patterns 
(Nuerk et al., 2005) elicit SNARC effects whereas our stimuli do not. It may also explain 
why SNARC-like effects might arise for some stimulus arrays but not others, if we assume 
that some arrays are more distinctive. Under this account, we predict that any manipulation 
that would make the stimuli more memorable might make participants more likely to form a 
temporary spatial representation of non-symbolic stimuli. This may explain why experiments 
that use a limited range of stimuli (specifically two-dot and nine-dot, as in Bulf et al., 2014) 
report a SNARC effect for non-symbolic number.   
Conclusion 
There is evidence to suggest that people will make spatial associations with non-
symbolic number when they process non-symbolic quantities. This is supported by the fact 
that SNARC-like effects have been reported for magnitude decisions to non-symbolic 
number in children (e.g., Ebersbach et al., 2014; Patro & Haman, 2012) and adults (Nemeh et 
al., 2018) and a SNARC effect has been reported for parity decision to dice patterns (Nuerk et 
al., 2005). However, in a series of four experiments, we do not find any evidence that people 
automatically access spatial-numerical associations when presented with non-symbolic, non-
canonical quantities. 
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